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INTRODUCTION

"There is no such thing as a level playing field."1
S EVEN YEARS ago, when the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) commenced, all involved parties committed to agree on rules
limiting government subsidies to industry. First proposed
in 1945, similar attempts in the past achieved only limited
success.2 Even agreement on the most fundamental issue,
the definition of a subsidy, was unresolved. The problem
was that, taken to the extreme, almost any government expenditure, such as one for education or road building, may
be interpreted as a subsidy. Direct payments to industry obviously qualified, but that was the extent of the consensus.
Whether unemployment programs, job training, and disaster assistance qualify as subsidies remains undecided.
Subsidies have proved to be hard to limit in part because
they are so effective. Governments use them "to promote
important objectives of national policy," 3 such as stimulating infant industries, supporting ailing industries, promoting exports, creating jobs, and in certain sectors, increasing
national security and national prestige.4 A related problem
is that subsidies involve sensitive governmental action only
curable through high level diplomatic negotiation.
Furthermore, subsidies are easily legislated because they
directly benefit certain groups, while their harm is spread
over all of society. The beneficiaries are readily apparent
while those hurt do not have a large enough stake in the
matter to lobby against them. Also, recipients are usually
politically popular and sympathetic groups, like farmers,
I PlayingFields; Influence of Government Subsidies on Aircraft Industry Competition, AIR
Aug. 1991, at 2.
Patrick J. McDonough, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, in 1 THE GATT
URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HisToRY (1956-1992) 809 (Terence P. Stewart ed.,
1993).
5 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, Preamble, reprinted in
GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELEc:TED DOCUMENTs 56 (Supp. 26 1980) [hereinafter Subsidies Code].
4 See McDonough, supra note 2, at 810.
TRANSPORT WORLD,
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who provoke little opposition. In short, the elimination or
reduction of subsidies requires international commitment
because "the concentrated interests of producers command
greater [national] political support than the diffuse interests of consumers,"5 which results in a classic tragedy of the
commons. There is also usually less opposition than one
might expect in importing countries who benefit from
cheaper goods as a result of these subsidies, as long as no
monopolistic intent is attributed to the subsidizing
6
country.

At times, it seems that subsidies benefit everyone. One
must, however, remember the original mission of the
GATT: to increase world prosperity.' These subsidies allow
countries without a comparative advantage to produce certain products, undermining world prosperity. In short, subsidization yields inefficiency, at least according to the GATT
paradigm.
In no industry has the subsidies question been more contentious than in aircraft manufacturing. The traditional
American prominence in the field has been shattered by
the European Community's Airbus consortium. The
United States and the European Community have been unable to resolve the dispute, though they have been negotiating for over twenty years. Recently, this one industry almost
thwarted the seven years' work of the Uruguay Round. Furthermore, in response to this dispute, the U.S. aircraft manufacturing industry has called for Congress to accept a new
"industrial policy" which would promote direct government
involvement in industry.8
This paper traces the evolution of the GATT subsidies
rules beginning with Article XVI of the original GATT and
the 1979 Subsidies Code. Part II focuses on the American
5 Id.
6 SeJOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELA.
TIONS 759 (3d ed. 1995).

Id. at 7-15.
Trade and Competitiveness of U.S. Industry: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 56-59 (1992) (testimony of Lawrence Clarkson, Vice
8

President for Planning and International Developments, The Boeing Corp.).
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and European conception of "industrial policy," which has
largely shaped these rules, and examines the recent pressure in the United States to accept industrial policy, in part
due to the influence of the aircraft manufacturing industry.
Part III focuses on the recently completed Uruguay Round
and uses the aircraft manufacturing industry's ultimate exclusion from any final agreement to exhibit the difficulty of
resolving the subsidies issue. Finally, Part IV considers the
effects of excluding an industry from the GATT process and
attempts to reconcile industrial policy with the goals of subsidy limitations. Throughout this analysis, the paper focuses on the bargaining positions of the United States and
the European Community, the major players in the aircraft
subsidies negotiations. This is not meant as a slight to the
other countries involved in GATT negotiations, but is simply a practical reflection of bargaining power.
II.

THE ORIGINAL GATT TREATY AND
THE TOKYO ROUND
By requiring parties to report them, the original GATT
treaty, signed in 1947, acknowledged that subsidies may adversely affect international trade. 9 Article XVI contained a
one paragraph obligation requiring countries merely to
"notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES in writing of the extent and nature of [their] subsidization," its estimated effect, and, if serious prejudice were likely to occur, to discuss
the subsidies with other concerned parties. 10
In 1955, additional obligations were added to Article
XVI. 11 The result was that the GATT differentiated between export subsidies, aids to promote foreign sales, and
domestic subsidies, which benefit an industry without regard to where its product is sold.12 Export subsidies were
forbidden on primary products, defined generally as fish,
9 Id.; see also The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.IAS. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GAT].
10 GATT, supra note 9, art. XVI(1).
1 SeeJACKSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 768-69.
12 SeeJOHN M. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 256, 259 (1989).
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farm, or forest products, if the subsidy permitted the country to obtain "more than an equitable share of world export
trade in that product." 3 For non-primary products, defined as everything else, parties agreed to "cease to grant
either directly or indirectly any form of subsidy" on their
exports if the result was a lower price in foreign markets
than in the domestic market. 14 This effectively forbade bilevel pricing on non-primary products.1 5 If these obligations were violated, Article VI of the GATT authorized
countries to impose countervailing duties.16 This remedy
has an equally complex history which is outside the scope of
this paper. Basically, if a subsidy obligation was violated, a
government was allowed to impose a tariff on that good in
an amount proportional to the subsidy, though each country has entertained evolving additional rules and requirements on these tariffs.
Because the original GATT was so effective in reducing
direct tariffs, the Tokyo Round, which lasted from 1973 until 1979, focused on the reduction of subsidies and other
nontariff barriers. 1 7 Conversely, at that time, governments
were under increasing pressure to grant subsidies, especially to industries ailing from the worldwide recession.
Therefore, the United States and the European Community
agreed that the aim of the resulting 1979 Subsidies Code
was not to eliminate the subsidies themselves, a drastic result, but to "reduce or eliminate [their] trade-restricting or
distorting effects.""'
As negotiation proceeded, it became clear that the
United States looked to this round to have subsidization,
but the European Community countered that "stringent international regulation of domestic subsidies would amount
IsGATT, supra note 9, art. XVI(3).
14 Id. art. XVI(4).

15The distinction between primary and non-primary goods in these additional
obligations caused their rejection by developing countries, so that most GATT nations did not recognize them. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 728.
16 Id. at 769.
17

is

McDonough, supra note 2, at 816.
Subsidies Code, supra note 3,at Preamble.
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to intolerable interference in their internal policy matters." 9 Nonetheless, the European Community was willing
to bargain because it wanted to soften the U.S. policy of
imposing countervailing duties against foreign industries
even when the opposing U.S. industry was not "materially
injured" by the subsidies. °
The two sides compromised by using different rules for
domestic and export subsidies.2 1 Export subsidies were absolutely forbidden for non-primary products,22 but they were
only forbidden for primary products if they resulted in a
country having more than an equitable share of world export trade in that product.2 3 Conversely, in Article XI of
the Subsidies Code, the contracting parties recognized that
domestic subsidies "are widely used as important instruments
for the promotion of social and economic policy objectives
and do not intend to restrict the right of signatories to use
such subsidies." 24 These domestic subsidies were permitted, but actionable by countervailing duties, subject to a
material injury requirement, which was the main United
States concession for the ban on export subsidies.
The Subsidies Code thus provided a two-track approach,
permitting domestic subsidies and forbidding export subsidies.2 5 Unfortunately, the distinction between these two is
not always clear. Furthermore, the Code did not define the
term "subsidy," but merely provided an illustrative list of
permissible subsidies based on their actions and objectives.2 6 Yet, as the subsequent negotiations over the aircraft
manufacturing industry illustrate, the most glaring failure
of the Tokyo Round was that the permitted domestic subsidies were just as contentious and effective in distorting
trade as the now-outlawed export subsidies.
McDonough, supra note 2, at 816.
0 See id. at 816-17.
21 See id. at 817; Subsidies Code, supra note 3,art. 11(1).
- Subsidies Code, supra note 3, art. 9.
'9

23 Id. art. 10(1).
24 Id. art. 11(1).
25

Id. arts. 9 & 11.

26Id. art. 9 & Annex.
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III. TWO DIFFERENT TRADE PARADIGMS
The subsidies question plagues the GATT talks primarily
because the major negotiating teams, the United States and
the European Community, have two fundamentally opposing historical attitudes towards subsidization. 27 The European political systems have traditionally mingled the public
and private sectors. This tradition was reinvigorated as Europe emerged from World War II, battered and bruised,
and dependent on massive governmental support to rebuild its torn economies. The notion of government involvement in industry continues today.
Conversely, in the United States government encroachment anywhere was viewed suspiciously and was deemed acceptable only under rare circumstances. For example, the
French believe that government is responsible for an individual's health and well-being from the cradle to the grave,
whereas in the United States, governmental support is supposed to provide its citizens with a backstop to be used only
in times of emergency. Similarly, much of European industry remains nationalized or dependent on governmental
support, whereas in the United States, aid is only expected
in times of emergency, such as the Chrysler bailout of the
early 1980s.
The two systems' approaches to subsidies reflect these attitudes. The European Community views demands to limit
domestic subsidies as interference with the responsibilities
and rights of its national governments, whereas the United
States sees them as an intrusion on the principles of the
free market. "U.S. policy has been guided by an economic
and political philosophy which presumes that subsidies distort resource allocations and international trade flows, undercut economic efficiency, and flout the law of
comparative advantage by enabling the development and
survival of otherwise uncompetitive industries.""8
2

See generally, Robin Gaster, EuropeanIndustrialPolicy, in EUROPE AND THE UNITED

STATES: COMPETITION AND COOPERATION IN THE

ed., 1994).
28 McDonough, supra note 2, at 844.

1990s 257-70 (Glennon S. Harrison
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Recently, though, industry and government leaders have
made ever-more persistent attempts to change this longheld view. Many scholars call for government "to reexamine the political economy and philosophical foundations of
our trading rules."2 9 Some point to the historical success of
managed industries in the United States, such as agriculture and the railroads, as precedents for a new active governmental role.3 ° It appears that doctrinal reasons remain
the main impediment to these calls for a new U.S. position.
At a recent Senate hearing this difficulty was concisely
framed in a response by the Chairman of Bell Laboratories:
Well, look, let us be blunt. If you use the term industrial
policy, certain people close their ears and certain people reject what you are saying. ...

I think what we need to be

discussing is what should we be doing to keep our industry
competitive and what should we not be doing. And if that is
called industrial policy, fine. I happen to agree. 31
This debate has been confused by the unclear subsidizing
effects of the massive U.S. defense budget, which in many
ways supports and finances industry research and production. The European Community frequently points out, and
many in the United States agree, that this has the same
practical effect on U.S. industry as more direct subsidies.
Senator Patrick Moynihan stated curtly: "If [anyone] wants
to know whether we should have an industrial policy, in the
name of God for the last 45 years, we have had the most
explicit industrial policy in the world. And that is the cold
war."3 ' Despite this apparent inconsistency of views, the "official U.S. position ... is to avoid any active industrial policy, preferring . . . to let the market pick winners and
Robert E. Scott, FlatEarth Economics: Is There a New InternationalTrade Paradigm?,
CHALLENGE, Sept. 1993, at 32. The author abandons comparative advantage theory

because of its inability to account for intra-industry trade and external market
imperfections.
30 Lane Kirkland, IndustrialPolicy:An Answer to Economic Chaos, 5 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REv. 73 (1993).
-1 Trade and Competitiveness of US. Industty: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1992) (testimony of Ian M. Ross, President Emeritus,
AT&T Bell Laboratories).
32 Id. at 63.
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losers."3 3 An additional political concern with subsidization
or industrial policy is that it results in increased government expenditures. At least since the Reagan years, the Republican party has consistently objected that industrial
policy will lead to larger governmental interference, larger
budget deficits, and greater inefficiency.
The negotiations between the United States and the European Community over aircraft subsidies reflect these two
differing trade paradigms, exhibit the practical difficulties
involved in reconciling them, and manifest the problem of
how to account for U.S. defense expenditures in resolving
the subsidies question. The European Community aircraft
consortium, Airbus, has been a major success. Formed in
1968 by combining four European Community government-sponsored aircraft manufacturers, 4 Airbus is now second only to Boeing in jet aircraft production. Airbus has
shattered what was once an American monopoly.3 5 In the
past decade, its share of the global aircraft market increased from seven percent in 1980 to twenty-seven percent
in 1989, while the United States market share
declined
36
from eighty-seven percent to sixty-five percent.
This success has been achieved, in major part, through
various types of direct and indirect subsidies, valued at up
to $26 billion. These subsidies include development and
program launch grants, funding of research programs, equity infusions, unpaid "loans," and exchange rate guaran" Trade and Technology: Implications of the GATT Negotiations:Hearingsbefore the Subcomm. on Technology and Competitiveness of the House Comm. on Science, Space and Technology, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1991) (opening statement of chairman Tim
Valentine) [hereinafter Trade and Technology Hearings].
34 The consortium consists of the Deutsche Airbus unit of Germany's Daimler-

Benz AG, Britain's British Aerospace PLC, France's Aerospatiale, and Spain's Casa.

35

See generally CONG. RES. SERV. FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON TECHNOLOGY AND COMPETITIVENESS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE, SPACE AND TECHNOLOGY, 102D CONG., 2D
SEss., AIRBUS INDUSTRIE: AN ECONOMIC
1992) [hereinafter AIRBUS REPORT].

AND TRADE PERSPECTIVE

4

(Comm. Print

- Stuart Auerbach, TurbulenceAhead for the Airbus Talks: Bush Administration Threatens Trade Complaint ifSubsidy Issue Isn't Settled by Sept. 30, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 1990,
at H1.
37

See AIRBUS REPORT, supra note 35, at 24-36.
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tees. 8 Additionally, a recent report commissioned by the
U.S. Department of Commerce concluded that the Airbus
had never made a profit on the sale of its aircraft and had
never achieved "commercial viability."39 In fact, no one disputes that the industry is subsidized, but the European
Community explains that its subsidization is necessary to
provide technology, jobs, national prestige, and security,
and that, in any event, since 1945 the United States has indirectly subsidized its own aircraft industry through defense
expenditures. The U.S. industry, comprised of Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, and Hughes Aircraft, and represented by
the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA), has long objected to the subsidization of Airbus, but has tempered its
response. AIA is afraid that too much pressure on Airbus
will alienate the European Community, freezing the U.S.
aerospace industry out of the world's second largest market.
Despite these differences, the European Community and
the United States both signed the Civil Aircraft Code of
1979 at the conclusion of the Tokyo Round. It was the
Round's only industry-specific agreement. 40 Throughout
these negotiations, the United States and the European
Community maintained their traditional positions. The
United States maintained that the aircraft industry should
operate on the basis of commercial competition, while the
European Community wanted to continue its subsidies.4"
The 1979 agreement ducked the subsidies question but liberalized aircraft trade by eliminating tariffs, prohibiting licensing requirements, and banning discriminatory
procurement. 42 However, this agreement did not cover aircraft subsidies, and its relationship with the Subsidies Code,
's

Id. at 24.

Jennifer A- Manner, How to Avoid Airbus II: A PrimerforDomestic Industry, 23 CAL.
W. INT'L LJ. 139, 142 (1992) (citing Gellman Research Associates, An Economic and
FinancialReview of Airbus Industrie, Sept. 4, 1990, at 4-3 to 4-8).
40 AIRBUS REPORT, supra note 35, at 39.
41 Id. at 37 (citing GILBERT R. WINHAM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE TOKYO
ROUND NEGOTIATION 239 (1986)).
42 Id.
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passed at the same time, was "uncertain from the start."43
Thus, heading into the Uruguay Round, the issue of aircraft
subsidies was revealed.
IV.
A.

THE URUGUAY ROUND

THE AGREEMENT

ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING

MEASURES

At the commencement of the Uruguay Round subsidies
negotiations, the United States' foremost objective was to
strengthen multilateral subsidy disciplines.44 The United
States hoped to ban all export subsidies on both primary
and non-primary goods, and extend domestic subsidies disciplines to other uncovered areas, such as industrial targeting, through clarification of terms and implementation of
dispute settlement rules.45 Finally, the United States
wanted to preserve the effectiveness of its countervailing
duty law and practice. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 summarized the U.S. strategy: "to define, deter, discourage the persistent use of, and otherwise
discipline unfair trade practices having adverse trade effects, including forms of subsidy ....
The European Community retained the same objectives
that it had in the Tokyo Round. The European Community
hoped to continue to use domestic subsidies as well as to
limit the effectiveness of U.S. countervailing duty law. Its
basic premise was that subsidies are legitimate policy tools
to aid industries and regions in economic transition.47 The
43Id. At the time, the aircraft industry expressed doubts as to future compliance
that were justified by recent congressional testimony calling for ensuring European
compliance. "[T]he U.S. Government should ensure that, as required by the GATr
Civil Aircraft Code, Airbus prices fully reflect the recoupment of all costs ...."
FinancialCondition of the Airline Industry: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the
Comm. on Public Works and Transportationof the House of Representatives, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 588 (1993) (testimony of Lawrence Clarkson, Corporate Vice President, The
Boeing Co.).
4 See Ronald K. Lorentzen, Subsidies and CountervailingDuty Measures, Bus. AM.,
Jan. 1994, at 13.
45 Id.

- 19 U.S.C. § 2901(b)(8)(A) (1988).

7 See McDonough, supra note 2,at 845.
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European Community looked to a definition of subsidies
that would permit these types of aid. Furthermore, because
of its more direct subsidization, the European Community
hoped to measure subsidies by their cost to government,
while the United States preferred measuring subsidies by
the actual benefit received.
The U.S. aircraft industry played a complex role in the
Uruguay Round because its size and strategic importance
allowed it directly to influence the official U.S. negotiating
position in the GATT. The industry, represented by the
AIA,generally agreed with the U.S. position of demanding
clearer definitions of subsidies, but it also wanted more effective dispute settlement, thereby "restoring credibility to
the GATT process" and reducing the need for unilateral
U.S. responses.48 The industry also wanted to shorten the
proposed five-year grace period to bring subsidies into conformity and require a presumption of serious prejudice for
all actionable subsidies.4 9 On the other side, Airbus agreed
with the European Community's attempts to halt further
limits on subsidization.
Eventually, the seven-year negotiations produced substantial limitations on subsidies use. Most importantly, after
forty-five years of negotiations, the parties agreed on the
definition of a subsidy.50 For GATT purposes, a subsidy is
deemed to exist if "there is a financial contribution by a
government or any public body within the territory of a
Member" involving (1) a potential or actual "direct transfer
of funds or liabilities;" (2) a foregone government revenue;
(3) government provided goods or services separate from
the infrastructure; or (4) "any form of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of the GATT" which confers
a benefit.5 ' This broad definition is narrowed by a requireAIA NEWSL. (Aerospace Industries Ass'n), Vol. 4, No. 6, Dec. 1991.
49Id.

soAgreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Dec 15, 1993, art. 1.1,
reprinted inTHE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 264 (1994) [hereinafter Subsidies Code 1993J; Lorentzen, supra note 44, at

13.
Subsidies Code 1993, supra note 50, art. 1.1.

",
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ment that the subsidy actually benefit an industry and a requirement that the subsidy be "specific to an enterprise or
industry or group of enterprises or industries."15 2 The latter

requirement reflects U.S. countervailing duty law and maintains its distinctions, allowing sub-national (state) subsidies,
but prohibiting central government subsidies to a region,
even if generally available.5"
The agreement then classifies subsidies into three
groups: prohibited, actionable, and non-actionable.54 Prohibited subsidies are those contingent on export performance or upon the use of domestic over imported goods, and
are specifically set forth in Annex I of the agreement.55
Members are allowed three years to eliminate these prohibited subsidies, which appear to include a ban on all export
subsidies (de jure and de facto) as well as local content
rules. 6 Actionable subsidies are those that cause "adverse
effects to the interests of other members," defined as injury
to their domestic industry, nullification of GATT benefits,
or serious prejudice to another member's interests.5 7 Here,
a presumption of serious prejudice exists where (1) the total ad valorem subsidization of a product exceeds five percent (based on the cost to the granting government); (2)
the subsidy covers direct forgiveness of debt; or (3) the subsidy covers operating losses sustained by a single firm if provided on more than one occasion." The remedy provisions
of these first two categories clarify the means for demonstrating the use of subsidies and create an obligation to remove them once identified.5 9
Id. art. 2.1.
Lorentzen, supra note 44, at 13. For a critique of the specificity test see Trade
and Technology Hearings,supra note 33, at 42-45 (statement of Charles Owen Verrill,
Jr., adjunct Professor of International Trade Law, Georgetown University Law
Center and Partner, Wiley, Rein & Fielding, Washington D.C.).
52
"

54 Subsidies Code 1993, supra note 50, arts. 3-8; JACKSON ET AL., supra note 6, at

770.
11Subsidies Code 1993, supra note 50, art. 3 & Annex I.
5' Lorentzen, supra note 44, at 13.

Subsidies Code 1993, supra note 50, art. 5.
Id. art. 6 & Annex IV. Note that article 6.7 exempts several specific subsidies
granted for non-trade based reasons.
51 Lorentzen, supra note 44, at 13.
57

58
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The final category, non-actionable subsidies, includes
safe harbor provisions for three types of subsidies. Into this
category fall all subsidies which are non-specific as provided
in Article II, as well as those for (1) general industrial research, if limited to seventy-five percent of eligible research,
costs, and fifty percent of precompetitive development activity; (2) regional development within areas that are neutrally determined to be disadvantaged; and (3) plant
adaptation to environmental standards, as long as limited to
twenty percent of a one-time operation.6 °
This is the first time the GATT specifically allows certain
subsidies, a fact which, predictably, has caused strong opposition in the United States. In January 1994, forty-four Republican senators suggested to U.S. Trade Representative
Mickey Kantor that they would vote against the GATT solely
because these provisions "promote industrial policy."6 The
senators' willingness to threaten to reject the seven-year
agreement over this one issue exhibits the far-reaching potential and revolutionary nature of the new Subsidies Code.
This new Code seems to incorporate most of the U.S. demands, providing for subsidy measurements based on the
benefit conferred to the recipient, as well as for more binding dispute resolution. 62 The new Code also appears to deter questionable subsidies by setting out clear rules as well
as providing for swift remedies. The new system should
benefit U.S. research and development (R&D) programs
that will no longer be vulnerable to foreign pressure to disclose their direction under the guise of unfair trade practice. 63 In addition, the new system will benefit U.S.
exporters of "clean technology" equipment and processes.'

- Subsidies Code 1993, supra note 50, art. 8.
w1Sen. Danforth Seeks Way to End Dispute with AdministrationOver GATT Accord, Irr'i.
TRADE DAILY, Mar. 10, 1994, at D2. The article suggests that a compromise is possible based on the consultation and remedy provisions of Article 9.
62 Lorentzen, supra note 44, at 13.
6s Id.
64

Id.
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The Subsidies Code also responds to U.S. demand by providing a shorter three year compliance period.65
For these benefits, the United States had to agree to the
adoption of the green light provisions which expressly allow
certain subsidies.6 This major doctrinal concession is a
boon for the European Community, where many explicit
subsidy programs are already in place.67 Only time will tell
whether this concession reflects, or will provoke, a new U.S.
recognition of the benefits of industrial policy. This new
system has the potential to cause fundamental changes in
the U.S. economy if, as Republican critics insist, it encourages the increased use of government subsidies in these
permitted areas. 6a Yet the Subsidies Code also is significant
for what it does not contain. Most notably it does not contain any agreement on the aircraft industry, the largest U.S.
exporter. In the final days of negotiations, this single issue
threatened to deny the world system all the benefits of
seven years of hard work.69
B.

THE FIGHT OVER AIRCRAFT SUBSIDIES

Airbus and the U.S. aircraft manufacturers have claimed
that they are subject to unfair competition.7" Each believes
the other uses unfair trade practices to gain market leverage.71 In short, the United States position is that the
Europeans are unfairly subsidizing their industry, making it
difficult to compete, while Airbus believes that the U.S.
manufacturers are also subsidized, albeit indirectly,
72
through the massive U.S. defense program.
65 Subsidies Code 1993, supra note 50.

- Id. art. 8.
supra note 35, at 21-31.
sSen. Danforth Seeks Ways to End Dispute with Administration Over GATT Accord,
supra note 61, at D2.
"See,
e.g., Aerospace Industy Could Pull Support for Aviation-Compromised GATT,
AEROSPACE DAILY, Dec. 10, 1993 at 400; see infra Part IV.B.4.
70 See ARBus REPORT, supra note 35, at 9.
67 See AIRBUS REPORT,

71 Id.
72 French Aircraft Industy Calls for Indirect Subsidies, INT'L TRADE DAILY, Dec. 22,
1993, at D8.
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The GATT negotiations have traditionally been viewed as
the proper forum to settle this dispute. The aircraft manufacturing industry holds a unique position in the GATT negotiations for several reasons. The industry is one of the
world's largest and, yet, is comprised of only a few players.
Thus, especially in the United States, the industry leaders
have an ability to formulate, and not just respond to, official policy. The market of buyers is also limited, demanding special deference to their concerns. For example, most
industries, suspecting a GATT violation, would simply file a
countervailing duty action, but the U.S. aircraft industry
sees this option as unavailing:
The Europeans are much [closer] together and ... in sev-

eral cases the airlines are, in fact, controlled or owned in
large part by the governments. They have made it quite
clear that if we bring a countervailing duty case, they will
immediately bring a like action against us and.., we will be
in a real trade war.7

After the limited success of the Tokyo Round, the United
States waited until 1984 to begin negotiations with the European Community to "limit and eventually eliminate subsidies [like those] paid to Airbus." 74 This process lingered
for the rest of the decade, while "the U.S. civil aircraft industry sat quietly on the sidelines" and watched Airbus become the world's second largest manufacturer, replacing
McDonnell Douglas. 7- Although concerned with the GATT
subsidies negotiations, the industry realized that the Civil
Aviation Agreement of 197976 was not up for renegotiation
7 U.S. InternationalTradePerformance and Outlook: Competitive Positionin the Automotive, Aerospace, and Chemical and PharmaceuticalSectors: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Trade of the Comm. on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. 462 (1992) (statement of Lawrence Clarkson, Corporate Vice President, The
Boeing Co.).

74 Manner,

supra note 39, at 141.

75 Id.

76 Agreement Concerning the Application of the GATT Agreement on Trade in
Civil Aircraft of April 12, 1979 on Trade in Larger Civil Aircraft, July 17, 1992, U.S.EC, availableat Office of the United States Trade Representative Executive Office of
the President, Washington, D.C., 20506 [hereinafter Agreement Concerning the Application of the GATT Agreement].
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and that its best interests might be served in bilateral negotiations." In 1987, for the first time, the United States and
the European Community began informal negotiations
over limiting Airbus subsidies outside of the GATT framework to hedge against the possibility that the GATT might
prove to be unsuccessful. 78 One insightful industry spokesman cautioned that "we can expect to see many agenda
items deferred again when the Uruguay Round comes to a
close."79
1.

The German Exchange Rate Case

The bilateral negotiations yielded initial success. The
United States moved from advocating a position of no government subsidies for development to conceding to a limit
of twenty-five percent. The European Community representatives moved from a seventy-five percent limit to a forty
to forty-five percent range. 0 But here the parties stalemated, at least until the United States discovered an explicit
export subsidy provided to Deutsche Airbus. In part because of pressure put on EC manufacturers by the declining
dollar, 1 the Airbus partner was provided exchange rate
guarantees by its government, under the auspices of a privatization program, worth an estimated $2.5 million on each
Airbus aircraft delivered in 1990.2 The U.S. team decided

to bring a GATT action against the European Community
in the hope of softening its intransigence in the negotiations.83 In January 1992, a GAT dispute panel ruled that
the German program was in breach of the Subsidies Code
because it was an export subsidy covered by the Annex to
7 AIRBUS REPORT, supra note 35, at 39.
78 Id.

- Robert E. Robeson, U.S. Trade Policy at the Crossroads, AIA NEWSL. (Aerospace
Industries Ass'n), Vol. 1, No. 7,Jan. 1989.
80 ARusS REPORT,

sura note 35, at 41.

81 Id. at 40.
82

Manner, sura note 39, at 148.

83 Id.
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the 1979 Subsidies Code, subsection j, which
prohibits cer84
tain exchange rate insurance programs.
This decision had two repercussions. First, it pointed out
the ineffectiveness of the current GATT Subsidies Code, because the European Community later blocked adoption of
the ruling, which was required for any remedial measures
to be put in place.85 Second, it hastened the conclusion of
the bilateral agreement, because it determined that the issue, although blocked, was nonetheless covered by the Subsidies Code and not just the evolving agreement. a6. The
importance of this distinction is twofold. First, the European Community was now on notice that its Airbus subsidies put it in the uncomfortable position of having to block
future actions under the Subsidies Code. This ruling also
made it apparent that the European Community system violated international law, as set forth by the GATT, an untenable position for a major trading power to keep for very long
over such a hody contested issue. After its victory, the
United States brought a second, broader action under the
Subsidies Code against Airbus subsidies.87 In response, the
European Community finally lowered its development cap
to the thirty to thirty-nine percent range.88
The 1992 Civil Aircraft Agreement
In July 1992, the European Community and the United
States signed an agreement that provided a solution to the
aircraft dispute.89 The agreement, which recognizes that
disciplines in the GATT Civil Aircraft Code of 1979 "should
be strengthened with a view toward progressively reducing
the role of government support,"90 sets up a cap on subsi2.

Id.
Id. at 149.
""See Aerospace Industy Could Pull Support for Aviation-Compromised GA7T, supra
note 69, at 400.
:7 Id.; Manner, supra note 39, at 150.
A AIRBus REPORT, supra note 35, at 42.
Agreement Concerning the Application of the GATT Agreement, supra note
76.
84

5,

-0 Id. at Preamble.
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dies for developmental support at thirty-three percent of total development costs and requires a reasonable
expectation of recoupment of these subsidies within seventeen years. 9 1 The latter provision is designed to counter European Community allegations that its subsidies will be
repaid. The more indirect aid given to aircraft development in the United States through the military budget is
limited to three percent of annual industry turnover and
four percent of the value of each firm's annual sales.92 The
agreement only covers aircraft with more than one hundred seats and, importantly, calls for further negotiation
under the GATT.93
In exchange for these restraints, the United States "caved
in on its longstanding position that defense contracts aren't
subsidies for U.S. firms."94 This seems to be a reasonable
and timely decision, because of the shrinking military
budget. Despite this concession, the U.S. industry was
pleased with the agreement. As a Boeing official explained:
[This agreement] will for the first time provide real disciplines over certain Airbus subsidies. The agreement includes a ban on production supports, which is noteworthy
in that this is the first agreement in which a domestic subsidy is prohibited. Furthermore, the agreement provides for
a cap, terms, and conditions on development funding which
will dramatically reduce Airbus' ability to subsidize new aircraft models.95
Of course, many problems still exist. The United States
effectively managed to limit subsidies through this bilateral
agreement to thirty-three percent of total development
costs, down from previous European Community subsidies
Id.
I art. 5.
Id.
93 Id. Annex II; U.S., EC Sign Agreement RestrictingSubsidies to Civil Aircraft Industy, 9
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 1243 (July 22, 1992).
94 AerospaceIndusty Wary of Looming Trade War, AEROSPACE DAILY, Nov. 16, 1992, at
245.
95Improving the Competitiveness of U.S. Industry: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1992) (statement of Lawrence W. Clarkson, Vice
President, Planning and International Development, The Boeing Co.).
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of about sixty percent, but this is still an enormous amount
of subsidization. 96 This concern over the amount of subsidization led the industry back to the GATT subsidies negotiations, where the United Statestried to incorporate and
strengthen the agreement and the European Community
tried to back away from its previous commitments.
3.

The Aircraft Industry and the Subsidies Negotiations

As attention focused on the GATT subsidies negotiations,
the U.S. aircraft manufacturers and Airbus disagreed on the
relationship between the 1992 agreement and the upcoming Subsidies Code.97 The U.S. negotiators wanted the talks
to leave the 1992 Agreement intact and perhaps build on its
commitments, while the European Community wanted a
code that abrogated the bilateral agreement and made it
harder for anyone to win relief under the GATI. 98 The European Community also argued, alternatively, that the bilateral agreement implied that aircraft are excluded from
coverage under the Subsidies Code, a reversal of the German Rate case. 99
The U.S. industry countered that "[a]ll efforts to exclude
aircraft from the disciplines of any strengthened Subsidies
Code must be resisted." 100 The U.S. industry also wanted
further dispute control mechanisms and urged the U.S.
government for increased indirect support, such as financing from the U.S. Export-Import Bank.101 These arguments
for a U.S. industrial policy were couched in terms of
"greater government cooperation and understanding." 0 '
As 1993 progressed, the debate became more heated.
The European Community claimed that the U.S. industry
U.S., EC Sign Agreement, supra note 93, at 1243.
supra note 2, at 956.
9 Id.
Id. at 952 n.780, 956.
100 Civil Aircraft Needs Continued Coverage Under the Subsidies Code, US. Industry Says,
9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 1386 (Aug. 12, 1992) (statement ofJohn Hayden, corporate vice president for The Boeing Co.).
97 McDonough,

101 Id.
102 Id.
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requests for additional indirect subsidies showed a lack of
good faith and said that U.S. efforts to include aircraft in
the GATT were "aimed at strangling the European aircraft
industry."1 0 3 Simultaneously, the French minister "unveiled

[subsidy] to promote quality in inan $87 million program
104
dustrial production."

As the GATT deadline of December 15, 1993 approached, the pressure mounted on both the European
Community and the United States to come to some kind of
agreement on this issue.10 5 But instead of striving towards
consensus, the two sides began making further demands,
because their respective industries were concerned that
their governments would sacrifice industry interests for the
GATT agreement as a whole.106 Each industry became nervous that it would be "used as a last minute bargaining
chip" to reach a final overall accord. 10 7 The European
Community asked for a "grandfather clause" to the Subsidies Code, so that the agreement would exempt programs
already in place, and for further restraints on indirect supviolating the four perports, accusing the U.S. industry 1of
08
cent limit of the 1992 agreement.

United States leaders were in a difficult position. First,
they wanted to ensure that there would be no retreat from
the 1992 bilateral agreement, which placed a thirty-three
percent cap on development subsidies.'0 9 They also hoped
for additional limits from the Subsidies Code.110 Their fear
was that only one of the provisions, of only one of the trea10 French Trade Official Says Airbus' Fears in GATT Talks Are Unjustified, 10 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1687 (Oct. 6, 1993) (statement of French Trade and
Industry Minister Gerard Longuet).
104

Id.

105

See, e.g., French Aerospace Group Says EC on "Offensive" Concerning Subsidies, INr'L

TRADE DMLy, Dec. 7, 1993, at D9.

See id.
Id.
10 French Aerospace Group Says EC On "Offensive" Concerning Subsidies, supra note
105, at D9.
-06Aerospace Industry Could Pull Support for Aviation-Compromised GATT, supra note
69, at 400.
110 Id.
106

107
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ties, would apply."' If that occurred, the European Community would either keep its thirty-three percent subsidies,
or be able to subsidize according to the new code, which
allows certain types of subsidies under its safe harbor provisions. The United States would then have to prove that
each subsidy was one of the prohibited types, requiring excessive monitoring, litigation, and investigation that the
1 12
leaders hoped to avoid.

The Agreement Not To Agree

4.

In hindsight, it is easy to see that the two sides would be
unable to resolve their differences before the GATT deadline of December 15, 1993. The European Community had
recently given what it deemed substantial concessions in the
1992 bilateral agreement. Similarly, the United States was
not about to backpedal from its thirty-three percent limit
on subsidies, nor accept "a proposal that effectively excludes aircraft from coverage in the overall Subsidies
Code."1 1 3 The U.S. industry believed that the only reason

for reaching the 1992 agreement in the first place was beAirbus subsidies were
cause the GATT panel decided that
114
covered by the subsidies regime.

Furthermore, the GATT talks covered an estimated two
trillion dollars in annual world trade, of which the aircraft
industry accounted for only several billion dollars. As one
Aerospatiale official put it, "[t]o let such a small amount
spark what could be one of the most punishing tariff wars
unleashed in recent memory would be 'absurd.' "113 The

aircraft subsidy issue had to be resolved by December 15,
1993, to assure passage of seven years of GATT negotiations
in all the other areas.
Id.
Id.
113 Aerospace Industry Could Pull Support For Aviation- Compromised GATT, supra note
69, at 400.
114 Id.
115 Aerospace Industry Wary of Looming Trade War, AEROSPACE DAILY, Nov. 16, 1992,
at 245.
I1

112
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Days before the December 15 deadline, executives of the
U.S. aerospace industry wrote a letter to U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor saying that the United States was
"conceding much more than it obtains"116 and that their
"bottom line" was that aircraft could not be excluded from
subsidies coverage, nor subjected solely to it." 7 Their concern was that if the Subsidies Code were the exclusive forum, the European Community would gain the advantage
of being able to classify each of its individual subsidies into
a permitted or non-actionable category of the new Subsidies Code.' 18 Also problematic was that "the EC would obtain the extension of disciplines on indirect supports into
the multilateral dispute settlement procedure, a potentially
damaging and far-reaching concession." 19 As it stood
under the 1992 agreement, only the direct supports were
tallied to determine whether they exceeded the thirty-three
percent cap.12 1 In an attempt to build on the 1992 agreement, the letter called for a one year period during which
12 1
neither side would challenge subsidies under GATT.
The U.S. industry also desired the GATT agreement as a
whole to receive the benefits of all other GATT provisions.
Like the automobile industry, aircraft manufacturing is
truly international in that components are shipped from all
over the world. The industry could not afford to lose the
benefit of the non-subsidy tariff reductions. The U.S. industry's position as of December 13, 1992 was summarized
16 Aircraft Agreement Shouldn't Be Bound By GATT Deadline, Executives Say, AEROSPACE DAILY, Dec. 10, 1993, at 404.

117See id.
118 Id. In fact, in Senate testimony, it was agreed that one could drive "a 747

through" the current subsidies code. U.S. InternationalTrade Peformanceand Outlook:
Competitive Positionin the Automotive, Aerospace, and Chemical and PharmaceuticalSectors:
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d

Cong., 2d Sess. 467 (1992) (statement of Lawrence Clarkson, Corporate Vice President, The Boeing Co.).
119 Many In Industry Support GATTAccord, INT'L BUS. & FIN. DAILY, Dec. 17, 1993, at

D1I.

Aerospace Industry Could Pull Support for Aviation-Compromised GATT,supra note
1
69, at 400.
2 Aerospace Leaders Push Kantor to Head Off Civil Aircraft GATT Code, AEROSPACE
DALY, Dec. 13, 1993, at 410.
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by an Aerospace Industry Association official: "We advanced
an interim solution which said let's give ourselves a year to
settle this problem on a good faith effort, and let's agree to
extend the standstill on bringing people before (the
22
GATT) for a violation."1
Ultimately, the U.S. industry's proposal was accepted,
though it resulted in "howls of protest from French and
German industrialists" 23 who believe that "the Americans
are allowed to continue to provide unlimited support for
their aerospace industry through indirect subsidies" be124
cause of a lack of enforcement of the 1992 agreement.
Under the final proposal, the aircraft industry is temporarily covered under the 1979 Subsidies Code with the new dispute resolution of the Uruguay Round. 125 While it appears
that the U.S. industry gained the final advantage, this is
only because the Europeans almost succeeded in abrogating the 1992 agreement or gaining exclusive GATT coverage. In short, neither side won, but the battle remains for
another day.
5.

The Next Time
After all of the last-minute drama, the bottom line is that
the aircraft subsidy negotiations are back where they
started. The industry, however, will receive its share of the
predicted $300 billion of trade benefits from the overall
GATT package. 126 The U.S. industry appears to be pleased
with the GATT talks, proclaiming that "despite a very tough
negotiating position from the EC, . .. the United States
negotiators supported the aerospace industry." 127 The AIA
122

Id.

123 U.S., Europe Set Aside Aviation Dispute To Speed Uruguay Round, AEROSPACE DAILY,

Dec. 14, 1993, at 415.
Economists Say Industry's GA7T Grumbles Prove Process Is Working, AEROSPACE
Dec. 15, 1993, at 426 (statement of Wolfgang Piller, Vice President of Germany's Deutsche Aerospace).
125 Id.
-2 See U.S., Europe Set Aside Aviation Dispute to Speed Uruguay Round, supra note 123,
at 415.
127 Many in Industry Support GATT Accord, supra note 119, at D1I (statement of Don
Fuqua, President AA).
124

DAILY,
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released a white paper, claiming that the resolution's principal benefits are coverage of aircraft components under
the Subsidies Code, access to new dispute settlement procedures, and the refusal to exclude aircraft subsidies from the
8
12
new Code.

Unfortunately, the negotiations may be more challenging
the second time around. The United States now has the
added problem of negotiating around two "footnotes" that
were added to the Subsidies Code at the very last minute:
the "first gives some added protection to the kinds of subsidies used in Europe ... [and] the second makes it harder

for countries looking for GATT relief to prove that a given
subsidy distorts the market." 12 9 The two sides, furthermore,

used up substantial energy and resources over the GATI
fight and perhaps also lost their trust and willingness to
130

work together.

Recently, the European Community accused the United
States of trying to "dismantle Europe's system of support,"
while guaranteeing impunity for its own.' 3 1 The French industry has asked its government for additional indirect subsidies, so that the European Community may negotiate on
equal terms with the United States next time.13 2 President
Clinton has already called for close monitoring of the European Community subsidies to ensure compliance with the
1992 agreement, and he has called for the use of American
embassies to "track and report" on the actions of the Airbus
countries.13 3 Whether this is simply a return to rhetoric
now that the pressure is off remains to be seen, but, while
the two sides have agreed to a one year extension, it is fortu128 Id.
129 European Parliament Calls for Strategy to Help Aircraft Sector Manufacturers, INT'L
TRADE DALY, Dec. 16, 1993, at D1O.
- After Unuay Round, Bilateral Negotiators Must Renew Old Bonds, AEROSPACE

DALY, Jan. 5, 1994, at 15.
'3' Id.

"3French Aircraft Industry Calls for Indirect Subsidies, INT'L TRADE DAiLY, Dec. 22,
1993, at D8.
- U.S. Plans Close Monitoring of US.-EU "Airbus"Agreement, INT'L TRADE DAILY,
Jan. 10, 1994, at D5.
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nate that they actually have until the middle of 1995 (when
the 1992 agreement expires) to come to a compromise.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The Uruguay Round subsidies negotiations taught us several lessons. First, the Round affirmed that the sheer scope
of the GATT talks assures their successful completion. In
the final days of negotiations there were several additional
contentious areas, such as labor standards and motion picture quotas. Yet there was already too much at stake to allow these formidable obstacles to halt seven years of
negotiations. In fact, the intensity of these disputes reflects
the parties' actual commitment to the GATT process. Yet
there are a few troubling aspects to these last minute maneuvers. First, many countries outside of the United States
and European Community complained that in the final
days they were all but ignored,134 leading to feelings of
marginalization from the GATT talks and the world economy. The two parties' brinkmanship has led other countries to reassess their influence in the GATT talks.
Second, leaving vital sectors of the world economy out of
GATT agreements is a dangerous precedent. If major industries are excluded from GATT coverage, its overall effectiveness is lessened, as is the incentive for further GATT
negotiations. Bilateral agreements are less likely to demand
principled reductions of world trade barriers, the original
GATT mission. Specifically, failure of the aircraft negotiations provides little hope for a resolution under any new
GATT talks and increases the likelihood of some kind of
adjustment in the 1992 bilateral agreement.
Conversely, many commentators view the omission of major industries from the talks in a more favorable light. They
point out that certain industries, like the aircraft industry,
are unique and that fragmentation of negotiations is the
most effective way for resolution. But this argument seems
to miss the fundamental point of the GATT: reduction of
- And Now For Something Completely Different, THE EC)NOMIST, Dec. 18, 1993, at 59.
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artificial barriers to increase world prosperity. Allowing individual industry exemptions removes any pressure for multilateral negotiation. Taken to an extreme, this would
render the GATT useless. One author summarized the theory of comparative advantage applicable to the aircraft industry: "as a large economy of 224 million people, the U.S.
is going to enjoy advantages, like economies of scale, that
lend themselves to having a strong industry in large, capitalintensive goods like aerospace." 3 5 The point is that the
involvement of non-economic but real world concerns,
such as national prestige, should not result in automatic exemption from the GATT.
Third, the passage of safe harbor exclusions for certain
subsidies strains the doctrinal underpinnings of the GATT.
The GATT is supposed to reduce artificial trade barriers.
These safe harbors for research and development, environmental adjustment, and regional development are subsidies, otherwise known as trade barriers, or elements of
industrial policy. Regardless of the semantics, these provisions signal an implicit movement away from the free market principles of the GATT to a more managed atmosphere.
The United States may soon embrace a new trade paradigm, one requiring fundamental restructuring of certain
parts of our economy.
Fourth, the United States must recognize the hypocrisy in
its belief that the defense budget is not a form of industrial
policy. Hopefully, this will receive full and frank discussion
during the congressional implementation debate. The January 1994 declaration by forty-four Senate Republicans that
they would oppose GATT implementation because it promotes industrial policy may force the United States to come
to terms with its position on government-industry partnerships. In fact, this process has already begun. United States
Deputy Trade Representative Rufus Yerxa recently advised
Congress not to be concerned that the new greenlighted
subsidies would allow other countries an edge over the
- Economists Say Industry's GATT Grumbles ProveProcess Is Working, supra note 124,
at 426.
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United States because the United States already provides
more research and development programs than any other
country. 136 It is no coincidence that the aircraft industry,
the industry that benefited the most from the cold war defense budgets, is one of the first to call for explicit recognition of the need for a new industrial policy.
While industrial policy runs counter to the original
GATT mandate, it may be the most effective means to advance national policy after the cold war. It is difficult to
imagine that the United States or any other power could
ever commit the kind of resources to industry that have
been committed to defense. Nonetheless, the most
profound result of the negotiations may be what is not recognized in the agreement: an implicit turning away from
the original GATT mission. If industrial policy becomes
widely accepted, then what is the place of GATT negotiations in a spiral of increasing government support to
industry?
Finally, we must ask whether the GATT is a forum that
may prove effective in the future. Future negotiations may
make the debate over subsidies appear to be a mere playground squabble, as the GATT expands to include more
sensitive topics such as workers' rights and environmental
concerns. These will bring new constituencies into the negotiations and redefine traditional country alignments and
interest group positions. It seems that perhaps the GATT is
moving away from its economic mission toward a more social orientation. As this occurs, we must remember to ask
ourselves whether it is wise to risk world recession, one potential result of a failed GATT negotiation, in order to motivate agreement on such subjective goals.

156R&D Provisions of New Subsidies Code Won't Be Used as Loopholes, Yerxa Says, Ir'L
TRADE DAILY, Apr.

22, 1994, at D3.
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